Protocol
- Pair via
fau://pair/ six-digit code →POST /papi/pair - Ed25519 device key generated on device; secret never leaves the install
- Device signing matches Device signing vectors
-
GET /papi/pending,POST /papi/decide,POST /papi/pause,GET /papi/activity?… - Query strings included in the signed target
- No calls to dashboard
/api/*; no reliance onX-FAU-Local
Push
- Own EAS project + APNs/FCM credentials (not FAU’s)
-
POST /papi/push-tokenafter pair; clear on remove - Push
datatreated as wake-only; content from signed pending - Test /
ap_test_pushdoes not open a synthetic approval - Polling works with notifications denied
Product / UX
- Deny / reject is first and easy
- Match code and agent domain are prominent
- Unverified / user-connected agents are labeled honestly
- Send requires confirmation
- Paused state is visible and reversible
- Offline: queue decisions or explain clearly; never drop a deny silently if you queue allows
Privacy copy
- Mail stays on the laptop; your app is not an inbox.
- Push carriers see domain + match code only — say so in Settings.
Interop
- Works against a stock FAU Mac node (reference
apps/macos) - Coexists with another paired device (second phone or reference app)
- Survives node restart; re-pair only when device was removed
Security review prompts
- Can a stolen push token forge an approval decision? (No — decisions need device signatures.)
- Can a malicious push body make you approve the wrong id? (Only if you skip pending fetch.)
- Is the device secret extractable without biometrics / secure enclave policy you intended?