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One sentence

Federated Agent Use (FAU) lets a remote AI assistant answer narrow questions about a person’s email without ever receiving their inbox credentials — mail stays on their laptop; permission is granted per request on their phone.

The problem

Today, “connect Gmail to my AI” usually means: give the product an OAuth token (or an app password), sync mail to their servers, and hope policy and logging are good enough. That fails three ways:
  1. Credential blast radius. A stolen inbox token is the whole mailbox.
  2. Data gravity. Once mail is copied off-device, revocation is theater.
  3. Opaque access. Users cannot see which messages an agent touched for which question.
FAU inverts the usual shape: the assistant comes to the mail, under a grant, and leaves with an answer — not a corpus.

Mental model

Think of three parties and a blind post office:
One-line refinement: the relay is a blind doorbell; the node is the house; the phone is the door lock.

Goals

  • Assistants can get useful, narrow answers from mail the user already has.
  • The user keeps custody of mail and credentials on their own machine.
  • Every access is scoped, revocable, and auditable in language a person can read.
  • The public rendezvous (relay) learns as little as possible and never decrypts node traffic.
  • Anyone can attempt contact (open addressing); permission stays local (closed authorization).

Non-goals

FAU deliberately does not:
  • Replace Gmail, IMAP, or the user’s mail client.
  • Host mail, embeddings, or full-text search in the cloud for agents.
  • Provide a global registry of “approved” AI vendors (except optional claim enrollment on the user’s node).
  • Guarantee the Mac is online 24/7 without the offline queue (and even then, envelopes are size-limited).
  • Stop a compromised Mac from reading its own mail (the node’s host is inside the trust boundary).
  • Make the relay unable to see metadata (timing, byte volume, HMAC of email, hostname). Blind ≠ invisible.

Terminology

Use these words exactly. Do not invent synonyms mid-document.

How the system is decomposed

Two planes

Control plane — TLS terminated by the relay at relay.<domain>:
  • Agents: resolve, offline queue
  • Nodes: register, ACME, tunnel WebSocket, self-service
Data plane — TLS terminated by the node, hostname <random>.relay.<domain>:
  • Agents: GET /.well-known/fau-node, POST /mcp
  • Phones: /papi/*
The relay peeks the ClientHello SNI, finds the matching tunnel, and pipes bytes. It must not terminate TLS for node hostnames (no CDN “orange cloud” on *.relay.).

Permission model (the part people get wrong)

  1. Open addressing. Anyone can POST /v1/resolve with an email. Unknown addresses get a decoy hostname with the same JSON shape (anti-enumeration).
  2. Closed authorization. Tool calls are signed as an agent identity. The node’s gateway checks grants and may require a phone approval before retrieving mail for the model.
  3. Retrieve before the model. The gateway filters which messages exist in the candidate set first. A prompt injection in an email cannot widen retrieval, because retrieval already happened under the grant.
  4. Phone is the human factor. Raw read and send are always prompted. Structured tools may auto-pass once a grant exists.

What each party can observe

Invariants (always true)

  1. Assistants never receive an inbox OAuth token or app password from FAU.
  2. The relay never decrypts data-plane TLS for a node hostname.
  3. A phone decision is accepted only with a signature from a paired device key (or an explicit local dashboard decide, recorded as such).
  4. Push notification payloads must not carry mail content; they are wake signals.
  5. /v1/resolve responses for unknown emails are shape-compatible with known ones.
  6. Device signatures cover the full request target including query string.
  7. Agent signatures cover method, target URI, authority, and body digest; nonces are single-use inside the expiry window.

Design posture (why it looks like this)

How to read the rest of these docs

Protocol version throughout: fau/1.