| Use a stolen inbox token | There is no inbox token. The node holds the IMAP credential; assistants only ever call tools. |
| Read a category you did not grant | The gateway filters by grant before retrieval (policy/gateway.py). The model receives a pre-filtered list. |
| Widen its own access with a prompt injection in an email | Access is decided before the model runs. An injected instruction can at worst produce a bad answer, never a wider retrieval. Detected injections are flagged on the answer and in the audit log. |
| Read raw email text without asking | get_excerpt is a raw-read tier: always a phone approval, never auto-granted. |
| Send mail on your behalf | send_draft requires a phone approval every time. Compose only ever produces a draft. |
| Replay a captured request | Signed requests carry a nonce the node records; a second use is refused (crypto/signatures.py). |
| Tamper with a request in flight | RFC 9421 signature covers method, target, host, and a digest of the body. |
| Impersonate another assistant | Identity is the domain, verified against the keys that domain publishes. Prompts show the verified domain, never a name the agent supplied. |
| Exhaust you with approval prompts | Rate-limited per domain; repeated denials auto-block; one-tap mute. |
| Make the node hammer a third-party domain | Key refetches for unknown key ids have a minimum interval, and fall back to cached keys. |
| Exfiltrate a code or card number inside a legitimate answer | Output checks redact one-time codes, card and account numbers, and passwords, then cap length (engine/checks.py). |
| Quietly answer a question it cannot actually answer | The extractive path requires a genuine match and otherwise refuses. A confident wrong answer is treated as a security bug, not a quality one. |