Skip to main content
What this system promises, what it does not, and where the promises are enforced in code.

The promise

Your mail stays on your computer. A remote assistant can obtain answers you have allowed, and nothing else. Every access is recorded in a log you can read and verify.

What an assistant cannot do

What the relay can see

The relay is blind to content but not to metadata. Stated plainly because the honest version belongs in public:
  • A keyed hash (HMAC) of your email address, so it can route to your node.
  • Your node’s random hostname and its IP address.
  • Connection timing and byte volume.
It cannot see mail, questions, answers, or grants: it forwards TLS it cannot terminate. It holds no decryption keys and makes no access decisions. Node hostnames are random rather than derived from your email, because SNI is visible on the network and an email hash can be brute-forced. The node watches Certificate Transparency logs for certificates issued on its own hostname, so a relay that tried to terminate TLS would be visible.

At rest

The SQLite store is encrypted per column with AES-GCM under a key sealed by the macOS Keychain (Secure Enclave where available). Search works without decrypting the index: it is a blind index of keyed hashes, so the index reveals no plaintext. Attachment bytes are never stored, only their metadata. If no keychain is available the key is written to a file named .insecure and the node says so out loud, rather than pretending.

The audit log

Hash-chained: each entry commits to the previous entry’s hash, so an entry cannot be removed or altered without breaking the chain. GET /api/audit/verify re-walks it and reports the first broken link. Every agent request records the agent, the grant, the query, the decision, the ids of the emails touched, and the full output that was returned. Your own decisions — approve, deny, revoke, block, mute, pause — are recorded too, because “who allowed this?” is as much a question as “what did it read?”.

Approvals

Approvals are signed on your phone by a device key created at pairing and held in the device keystore behind biometrics where the device supports it. The relay cannot forge them and neither can the node: the signature is checked against the key registered at pairing. Prompts carry a 2-digit match code shown by both the assistant and the phone, so a prompt arriving out of the blue is recognisable as such. The pattern follows OpenID CIBA: initiated by the client, approved on a separate device, no redirect. Requests are signed over the full request target including the query string, so a parameter cannot be rewritten in flight. Both sides are pinned to [Device signing vectors](/reference/device-signing).

Where it is weakest

Stated because a threat model that only lists strengths is marketing:
  • The node’s own machine. Anything running as you can read the dashboard token and reach loopback. Encryption at rest protects a stolen disk, not a compromised session.
  • The local model’s judgement. Output checks are patterns; a novel encoding of a secret could pass. This is why retrieval is filtered first — the model’s mistakes are bounded by what it was allowed to see.
  • Capability tokens are a compatible implementation of Biscuit’s properties, not the Biscuit library, which needs a Rust toolchain. Swappable, and worth swapping.
  • Relay metadata under India’s DPDP Act needs legal review before launch, and the transparency page above needs publishing.

Reporting

Security issues: open an issue marked security, or mail the address in the repository metadata. Please include what you could reach and how.